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The Bretton-Woods Conference of 1944 established rules that
governed the economic relations among countries for almost 30 years.
An essential element of these rules was a dependence on fixed
exchange rates. The competitive devaluations of the 1930’s, which
many authorities believed responsible (at least in part) for plunging
the industrialized countries into depression, strengthened a natural
aversion to floating exchange rates. Relations among currencies were
to be fixed and changes were to be made only under dire circumstances.
Equilibrium in the external accounts of individual countries was to
be maintained by the use of appropriate domestic macroeconomic
policies. If a disequilibrium in the external accounts developed,
the remedy was to be sought first by changes in domestic policy.
Only after domestic policies had failed was there to be a realign-
ment of exchange rates.
The Bretton-Woods regime came to an end for all intents and
purposes in March, 1973, when generalized floating exchange rates
were established among the industrialized countries. We now have a
mixed system in which exchange rates float relatively freely among
some countries (albeit with a great deal of intervention), but in
which many countries still keep their exchange rates tied to the
dollar or to other reserve currencies.
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Exchange rate arrangements are, of course, more diverse than
just fixed or floating. At a minimum, one can identify at least
five different exchange rate regimes: (1) countries pegged to a
single regime, (2) countries pegged to some “basket” of currencies,
(3) countries that float jointly, (4) countries that float indepen-
dently, and (5) countries that change their currency values on the
basis of a predetermined formula. To gain some perspective on the
significance of flexible exchange rate regimes, the IMF estimates
that for total trade among member countries, less than 1/5 of such
trade takes place with pegged rates and more than 4/5 of it takes
place under floating rate regimes.
The main thesis of my paper is that the nature of the exchange
rate regime has important implications for both agriculture and
agricultural policy. It affects the way that monetary and fiscal
policy affect the agricultural sector, and at the same time influ-
ences the nature of external shocks to which the sector is submitted.
An important conclusion of my paper is that under a regime of float-
ing exchange rates the trade and trade-competing sectors have to bear
an important share of the adjustment to changing monetary and fiscal
policy. Hence, if a country either imports or exports agricultural
products, its agricultural sector may be subject to more instability
under a regime of floating exchange rates than under a regime of fixed
exchange rates. From these conclusions there are important implica-
tions about such things as stocks policy, adjustment policy, and
domestic price policy.
I would like to divide my comments into four parts: (1) a
discussion of flexible exchange rates and economic independence;
(2) an analysis of macroeconomic policy with flexible exchange rates3
and an international capital market; (3) an analysis of macroeconomic
policy and agriculture; and (4) a discussion of some of the implica-
tions for agricultural policy. My analysis tends to draw more on
the export case than on the import case, but it is important to
recognize that the issues are pertinent to both groups of countries.
FLEXIBLE EXCHANGE RATES AND ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE
The conventional view of alternative exchange rate regimes has
been that a system of flexible exchange rates would give individual
countries more independence in their domestic macro-stabilization
policies. Moreover, an important assumption has been that greater
stability in the domestic economy would be a logical consequence of
such a system, for monetary and fiscal authorities would presumably
be able to pursue policy measures more suited to the domestic
situation, and would not have to impose adjustments on the domestic
economy as a means to bring the foreign sector into equilibrium.
Those conclusions now seem overly sanguine. The problem is
that such arguments largely neglect the capital accounts or the
international capital markets. As I will attempt to show below, the
international capital market can be an important means of linking
one economy to another. Once they are linked by this means, a
country has no more independence in its economic policy with flexible
exchange rates than it has with fixed exchange rates, although it
obviously gains an additional means of adjustment. With respect to
the expected independence in policy making, it is worth noting that
economic summits to coordinate economic policies have been much more
frequent since exchange rates were freed up than they were before.Perhaps there was a time when international capital markets
were not important. But that obviously is no longer the case. The
Eurocurrency market, for example, is huge. Moreover, it is relatively
easy to gain access to this market, and it is virtually free of
regulation or intervention by national or international agencies.
The availability of this large capital market deserves a great deal
of credit for the success with which international money markets
handled the gorge of petro-currencies associated with the OPEC-
i.nducedhikes in oil prices. It also has now become an important
means by which the economic policies of one country impact on another.
This “open” capital market of Eurocurrencies is not the only
dimension to the international capital market, however, nor the only
indication that capital is highly mobile among countries. Private
banks and consortiums of private banks in the United States and in
European capitals have also contributed in an important way to
financing the short-term balance of payments problems that low-
income countries have suffered in recent years. In addition, those
same banks and consortia have played an increasingly larger role in ‘
financing longer-term development programs.
The consequence of a high degree of international mobility of
capital is that the interest rate is no longer a completely endogenous
variable subject to the control of domestic monetary and fiscal
authorities. Rather, the interest rate now takes on a high degree
of exogeneity for many countries - depending on the relative impor-
tance of the country in international capital markets. The real
interest rate is determined in international markets, with arbitrage5
1/
tending to equalize the interest rate throughout the world.– This
integrated capital market influences the way that monetary and fiscal
policy impacts on an economy and at the same time provides a linkage
among the policies of various countries. The equalization of interest
rates is also why the close integration of international monetary
markets is viewed by many as a mixed blessing. Movements of capital
in response to small interest rate differentials are frequently
alleged to frustrate the domestic stabilization policies of monetary
authorities. Other complaints have been quite common lately, and are
one of the reasons why some countries want to return to a regime
of fixed exchange rates.
MACROECONOMIC POLICY WITH FLEXIBLE EXCHANGE RATES
AND AN INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKET
If the exchange rates are fixed and the international capital
market is weak or non-existent, monetary policy will tend to have a
rather broad effect on the domestic economy. To put it in its simplest
form, a policy of monetary ease designed to stimulate the economy
will lower interest rates, thereby stimulating the construction
sector, investment, and consumption. A policy of monetary restraint,
on the other hand, will raise interest rates, thereby choking off
construction, investment, and consumption.
With flexible exchange rates and a well-developed international
capital market, the mechanism by which monetary policy operates is
quite different, This difference is quite significant for agriculture
if agricultural products are tradeables- -either as exports or as imports.
To illustrate what this difference is all about, let’s suppose the
authorities want to stimulate the economy, and assume
~-’Although real rates of interest will tend toward equality, nominal
rates will differ to reflect inflationary premiums,6
again that they decide to do it through an expansion in the quantity
of money. Monetary expansion will in the first instance put downward
pressure on the rate of interest, other things being equal, and if
capital is highly mobile there will be a capital outflow - an out-
flow that will continue until domestic and international interest
rates are equalized if capital is sufficiently mobile. The conse-
quence of the capital outflow is to bid up the price of foreign
currency, which is to say that the value of the domestic currency
would decline in international markets. The decline in the value of
the domestic currency would make imports more expensive, while
providing a stimulus to exports. The demand for domestic output
would consequently increase, and adjustments in the trade sectors
(and trade-competing sectors) would be the means whereby the
authorities attain their stabilization objective.
The important point to note is that the channels through which
the economy is stimulated are rather different than they would be
if exchange rates are fixed and if capital were immobile, or if
there were barriers to international flows of capital. An important
effect of the monetary policy is through the trade sectors, whereas
it would tend to be principally through the non-traded goods and
services sectors if capital were not mobile. Although not directly
pertinent to my paper, it is worth noting that this form of adjust-
ment now constitutes one of the main threats to the maintenance of
free international capital markets. The point is that governments
are not likely to remain indifferent between whether their countries
increase investment by lending abroad or by engaging in real capital
formation at home. Under the present institutional arrangements,7
Ilowever, the attempt to stimulate capital formation at home is
likely to lead to exports of capital.
Now , suppose as an alternative that the authorities want to
restrain demand by pursuing a tight monetary policy or restraining
the growth in the money supply. Upward pressure would be created
on domestic interest rates, capital would flow in from abroad to
bring about equalization, and the value of the domestic currency
would rise in international markets. A rise in the value of the
domestic currency would stimulate imports and reduce exports, other
things being equal. The consequence would be to dampen down the
economy - as policy makers desire. But once again the effect of
the policy would be realized through the trade sectors - through
adjustments in the import and export sectors - and not through
that part of the economy that is producing non-traded goods and
services.
One should not conclude from this analysis that a system of
relatively flexible exchange rates and a well-developed international
capital market is either better or worse than the previous system
of fixed exchange rates and a poorly developed capital market. I
frankly don’t think we know enough about how such a system works in
practice to draw any firm conclusions. Moreover, I believe our
current experience can be viewed largely as an exercise in trying
to learn how such a system would in fact work. It would seem that
the system of flexible exchange rates and relatively free inter-
national capital markets has served us quite well in our recent
period of stress. However, the new system creates a quite differentenvironment for agricultural policy, especially if trade in ag-ri-
cultural products is important. And that’s what I want to turn to
next.
MACROECONOMIC POLICY AND AGRICULTURE
An important implication of this analysis is that macroeconomic
policy has a quite different effect on agriculture under the two
exchange rate regimes. With fixed exchange rates the main effect
of changes in monetary policy was transmitted to agriculture through
the inter-sectoral labor market. Demand for agricultural output
over the cycle was relatively stable and agricultural capital markets
were relatively isolated from conditions in national monetary markets.
Moreover, a major share of the capital for agricultural investment
came from internal financing,
Tight money policies, however, almost inevitably led to higher
levels of unemployment. Out-migration from agriculture is quite
sensitive to the level of unemployment. And the rate of out-migra-
tion has a great deal to do with income of farm people. Hence
shifts in monetary policy impacted on agriculture in large part
through the labor market.
Under the new situation, the effect of macroeconomic policy is
quite different, especially if agriculture is either an export
sector or if agricultural products are imported in significant
quantities. In the first place, demand for domestic agricultural
resources will no longer be relatively stable. To the contrary, it
will shift in response to changes in monetary policy, with the
source of the shifts being either shifts in foreign demand or for-
eign supply (depending on whether an importer or exporter).9
But there are other effects as well, especially if the inter-
national capital markets are well developed. Capital will flow
back and forth from one country to another in response to shifts in
monetary policy. Such shifts may make for a more efficient use of
the world’s resources. On the other hand, they may create serious
stabilization problems for individual countries, as well as political
difficulties.
Finally, asset values in agriculture - especially the value of
land - will be sensitive to the exchange rate. This will be both a
product-market and capital-market effect. But it also has important
implications for further capital formation in agriculture.
IMPLICATIONS FOR AGRICULTURAL POLICY
One of the first implications is that world agriculture will
tend to be more unstable in the new regime than it was in the past.
Given that agricultural trade is important to a large number of
countries, agriculture in individual countries can expect to exper-
ience larger shocks in the future due to shifts in monetary policy
and exogenous shifts of capital. Moreover, for exporting countries,
the effects of those shifts will be transmitted in such a way that
they affect the demand for agricultural output. Hence, in the future
we should expect to have a rather unstable demand for the agricultural
output of individual countries, in marked contrast to the past, with
the source of that instability coming from the foreign sector, even
though those fluctuations of foreign demand are an indirect conse-
quence of domestic monetary and fiscal policy.
It is also important to note that there can be important
international flows of capital that have little to do with domestic10
monetary and fiscal policy, and that these can impose further
exogenous shocks on agriculture. For example, a shift out of other
currencies into dollars can cause the value of the dollar to rise,
thereby reducing the foreign demand for U.S. exports, other things
being equal. Similarly, a shift out of dollars into other currencies,
for whatever reason, can cause the value of the dollar to decline,
thereby stimulating exports. These monetary shifts, whether motivated
by speculative motives or more basic investment decisions, can be an
important source of shocks to U.S. agriculture as well as to the
agriculture in other countries.
Central banks can sterilize both the external shocks and the
induced changes in the exchange rate by an appropriate open market
operation in the foreign exchange markets. There are limits to the
amount of such interventions, however, since foreign exchange
reserves are not typically unlimited. But when there are such
interventions, of course, the system has moved away from flexibility
and back towards a fixed exchange rate regime.
There are a number of implications that follow from this
analysis. The first is that agriculture in the aggregate is not
noted for its flexibility in adjusting to changing economic conditions,
although as modernization takes place it may have more flexibility
than it has under more traditional conditions. But the biological
process inherent in agriculture clearly affects its responsiveness,
and with sectors such as beef that have large inventory components,
accelerator effects can cause policy to be rather destabilizing.
This raises doubts about monetary and fiscal policies that depend
for their effectiveness on adjustments in sectors such as agriculture.11
Although agriculture is relatively unimportant in the total economy
of many countries, it is sufficiently large that it could attenuate
the effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policy.
Another implication for agriculture follows from the accelerator
effects and the livestock sector. Recent experience of the U.S. is
again an interesting example. Shifts in grain prices, induced at
least in part by shifts in exchange rates, are imposing shocks on
both the beef and pork sectors - and at rather critical times in
their production cycles. Managing these effects is quite a chalTenge
to policy makers.
Another implication, of course, is that agricultural economists
have another important reason for taking a greater interest in
monetary and fiscal policy. Moreover, their perspective has to be
somewhat different than it has been in the past. Direct effects of
such policies will probably be even less important than they have
been in the past, with the indirect effect through fluctuations in
exchange rates taking on added importance.
A corollary of this, of course, is that in a world of flexible
exchange rates macroeconomic policy makers ar~ not likely to leave
as much autonomy to agricultural pol~cy as they do in a world of
fixed exchange rates. Rather, food and agricultural policy is
likely to be woven much closer into the overall fabric of general
economic policy.
The policy with respect to grain reserves also takes on a
somewhat different perspective than it has had in the past. The
presence of reserves or a reserve system could serve to blunt the
effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policy. In a period of economic12
slack, when the government was increasing the money supply, the
desired consequence would be that the increase in foreign demand
that resulted from the decline in the exchange rate would lead to
an increase in agricultural output and the demand for factors of
production. But if stocks were released to meet this foreign demand,
say because a relatively inelastic short-run supply caused food
prices to rise in the face of this shift of demand, the effect could
be to reduce the stimulus to factor demand. If the authorities had
a target level for reserves, the reduction in stocks would eventually
lead to an increased demand in order to rebuild them. But this would
be only after a lag.
Grain reserve policy traditionally has been viewed in large
part as a means of offsetting fluctuations in supply, especially
domestic supply. In an economy with floating exchange rates,
especially if the country should be an agricultural exporter,
reserves may have multiple objectives. This new perspective needs
to be introduced into our analyses of grain reserves.
Another issue has to do with domestic agricultural policies
that attempt to fix agricultural prices. Clearly that will be much
more difficult to do with a regime of floating exchange rates. A
system of price bands, or price corridors, similar to what the U.S.
now uses, is likely to be the more common approach. It is interest-
ing to note that our own domestic price policy took this approach
starting with the 1973 farm legislation - the very year we shifted
to a system of floating rates.13
Finally, we seriously need to develoP more effective positive
adjustment policies to deal with the shifts in demand against
domestic agricultural resources that are likely to occur in the
future, The growing availability of off-farm employment for farm
people in many countries provides an important adjustment mechanism.
But that alone is not likely to be sufficient to handle the resource
shifts expected under a system of flexible exchange rates.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The days when agriculture in most countries could be analyzed
through the prism of a closed-economy model are long since over.
It isn’t just that the volume of agricultural- trade has grown so
rapidly, or that individual countries have become more dependent
on trade. The shift to floating exchange rates has changed the way
that domestic monetary and fiscal policy impact on the sector, and
also exposes the sector to a wider range of external shocks. And
the growing integration of international capital markets has impor-
tant implications for agriculture.
We have a great deal of sorting out to do before we fully
understand the new circumstances in which we now find ourselves.
At the same time, the need for new institutional arrangements is
ever before us. Institutional innovation is needed for both our
domestic economies, and for the relationships we have with other
countries. Our challenges into the next decade are quite great.
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